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Emerging research has highlighted the utility of measuring individual differences in
decision-making competence (DMC), showing that consistently following normatively
rational principles is associated with positive psychosocial and health behaviors.
From another level of analysis, functional theories of personality suggest that broad
trait dimensions represent variation in underlying self-regulatory systems, providing a
mechanistic account for robust associations between traits and similar life outcomes.
Yet, the degree to which broad dispositional personality dimensions predict global
tendencies to respond rationally is less understood. In a large online community sample
(N = 804), we tested the associations between HEXACO personality dimensions, a 6-
factor structural trait model, and a subset of DMC indicators (Applying Decision Rules,
Resistance to Framing, Recognizing Social Norms, and Consistency in Risk Perception).
Additionally, we examined gender differences across the DMC, first considering the
potential for measurement non-invariance across groups for the DMC. We observed
partial measurement invariance between men and women; only the Applying Decision
Rules scale showed evidence of differential functioning across groups. Controlling for
these differences, analyses revealed that higher Conscientiousness, Honesty/Humility,
and Openness were associated with higher DMC scores. In contrast, Emotionality and
Extraversion demonstrated gender-specific associations. Specifically, low Extraversion
was associated with higher DMC scores for men, whereas higher Emotionality was
associated with higher DMC scores for women. Our results suggest that traits related to
self-regulatory functions of cognitive and behavioral control, and cognitive flexibility are
associated with an increased tendency to engage in rational thought.
Keywords: HEXACO, HEXACO Honesty/Humility, conscientiousness, decision-making competence, decision-
making, individual differences, gender differences
INTRODUCTION
Each day, the decisions that we make have the potential to directly impact our health, happiness,
and well-being. It follows that the ability to make sound, “quality” choices is likely to promote
positive outcomes and minimize the possibility of negative ones. However, what makes a “quality”
decision, and why do people often fail to make them? Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972)
seminal investigations of heuristics and biases, researchers have acknowledged that human decision
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processes often deviate from predictions made from normative
models of rationality (e.g., Expected Utility Theory, von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). Instead of employing a
rational analysis, individuals frequently base their choices on
a subset of information available, limited information searches,
and preferences that may switch as a result of changes in
how irrelevant attributes of the available choice options are
presented. This “bounded rationality” is believed to be a
cognitive adaptation developed to best make efficient and
accurate choices in light of cognitive processing limitations,
such as limited working memory (Simon, 1991). Though this
efficient, non-compensatory approach often leads to a satisfactory
choice, the indiscriminate application of mental shortcuts can
lead to judgmental errors that may bear significant costs to
well-being, finances, and society at-large (Hastie and Dawes,
2010).
Emerging research suggests that stable individual differences
in the tendency to respond rationally are associated with
positive health and financial outcomes (e.g., Parker et al.,
2018). These results complement similar evidence of predictive
validity observed in the personality literature. Specifically,
broad dimensions of personality, such as those recovered
in structural models like the “Big 5” and HEXACO (e.g.,
Goldberg, 1993; Ashton and Lee, 2007) predict life outcomes
that are believed to be, in part, related to advantageous
(and disadvantageous) decision processes (e.g., educational
attainment, workplace performance and behaviors, substance
use, antisociality; Roberts et al., 2007). In fact, new perspectives
in personality theory view traits as phenotypic expressions of the
efficiency of broader self-regulatory systems that subserve the
decisions that we make (DeYoung, 2015; Wood and Denissen,
2015). However, associations between rational responding and
broad-level personality dimensions largely have not been well-
explicated. Prior studies have examined the associations between
decision behavior and personality, but often have done so with
a single decision paradigm, a narrow range of traits, and/or with
small sample sizes that raise the possibility for non-replication of
effects (e.g., Levin et al., 2002; Lauriola et al., 2005; Parker and
Fischhoff, 2005).
The current study aimed to address this gap in the
literature. Specifically, we tested the degree to which personality
traits were associated with individual differences in decision-
making competence (DMC), a construct that aims to quantify
individual differences in rational responding across six decision
domains (e.g., Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin
et al., 2007; Parker et al., 2018). Additionally, we considered
these associations in light of mixed evidence suggesting
potential gender differences with respect to DMC performance.
For instance, men self-report engaging in more risk-taking
behaviors, but typically show better performance on laboratory-
based decision-making paradigms (e.g., Byrnes et al., 1999b;
Weller et al., 2010). Similarly, whereas men perform better
in laboratory tasks involving probabilistic reasoning, these
effects appear less strong, or even absent, when a decision
does not heavily recruit this process (Stanovich et al., 2017).
Establishing these associations has the potential to not only
illuminate who makes suboptimal decisions, but also why
certain individuals may engage in poorer real-life decision
outcomes.
Assessing Individual Differences in
Rational Responding
Researchers have increasingly acknowledged considerable
individual differences in the tendency to respond in a manner
consistent with predictions made from normative models of
rationality, such as Expected Utility Theory (Lauriola and Levin,
2001; LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2003; Levin et al., 2002; von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1947; West et al., 2008). These tendencies
appear to be interrelated across tasks, suggesting that reasoning
errors are not solely context-dependent, but instead, driven by
a set of common cognitive mechanisms (Stanovich et al., 2017).
This insight has led to the development of assessment batteries
comprised of decision-making tasks that aim to quantify an
overall aggregate of individual differences in rational responding
(Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007;
Halpern, 2010; Stanovich et al., 2017).
In particular, DMC assessment batteries include several
indicators of decision quality, using tasks that compare an
individual’s response to that predicted by a normative standard.
Such standards can be met either via (a) coherence, representing
response consistency across multiple presentations of objectively
equivalent, but differently presented, decision problems (i.e.,
risky-choice framing tasks; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), or
(b) correspondence (i.e., accuracy of an individual’s response
compared to an objectively correct answer, such as the ability
to follow a series of rules to select a correct option out of
a multi-attribute matrix; Payne et al., 1993). As an objective
performance test, DMC can be distinguished from self-reported
measures of perceived decision-competence, which tap self-
efficacy beliefs (Byrnes et al., 1999a; see Weller et al., 2013 for
a similar contrast in the domain of numeracy). Also, though
there has been a link between cognitive styles (e.g., polarized
thinking, need for cognition), and both DMC and personality
(Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Delaney
et al., 2015; Volkova and Rusalov, 2016), we consider the former
a descriptive construct that highlights dispositional tendencies
to process information (e.g., “I am the type of person who
likes to have as much information as possible before making
a decision”). However, although certain cognitive styles may
indeed be related to a greater tendency to respond rationally,
cognitive style scales do not directly tap into these tendencies.
Additionally, it is possible that an individual may process decision
information deliberately, but apply “contaminated mindware,” or
biased and faulty premises about the world, which subsequently
may lead to non-normative responding (Stanovich et al., 2017).
Finally, DMC can be separated from measures that aim to reflect
everyday decision quality in terms of behavioral outcomes, such
as the Decision Outcomes Inventory (DOI; Bruine de Bruin
et al., 2007; Dewberry et al., 2013; Geisler and Allwood, 2015).
Whereas a measure like the DOI reflects outcomes that may
or may not be the result of a rational decision process, the
DMC construct focuses on the adequacy of the choice itself (i.e.,
rational responding), independent of outcomes. This difference
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is important because even though a quality decision (from a
rational decision-making perspective) was made, the desired
outcome may not be realized, and vice versa.
Prior studies have demonstrated convergent validity between
DMC and neurocognitive mechanisms believed to promote
advantageous decision-making, such as executive function,
working memory, and inhibitory control, and other decision
skills (Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007;
Del Missier et al., 2012; Parker and Weller, 2015; Weller et al.,
2015b; Parker et al., 2018). Additionally, higher DMC scores
appear to correlate with the likelihood to desist from engaging in
problematic behaviors. For instance, Parker and Fischhoff (2005)
found that lower DMC scores predicted higher incidence of
delinquency, substance abuse and health-risking sexual behaviors
(c.f., Weller et al., 2015a). Further, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007)
observed that low DMC scores were associated with an increased
tendency to report negative outcomes across a variety of domains.
Similarly, Weller et al. (2015a) reported that lower DMC scores,
measured at age 10–11, predicted increased conduct, emotional,
and peer problems, as well as lower self-reported pro-social
tendencies 2 years after the initial DMC assessment.
Personality and Decision-Making
Competence
Similar to the associations between DMC and potentially
problematic life outcomes, research also has demonstrated robust
associations between broad-spectrum trait dimensions and life
outcomes (Arthur and Graziano, 1996; Bogg and Roberts, 2004;
Roberts et al., 2007). Functional accounts of personality posit
that these associations exist because traits represent a collection
of affective, behavioral, and cognitive tendencies that (a) reflect
strategic means by which an individual achieves a desired
goal state, and, more broadly, (b) variation in the efficiency
and effectiveness of a broader self-regulatory system (Denissen
et al., 2013; DeYoung, 2015; Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 2015).
For instance, DeYoung (2015) cybernetic Big 5 personality
model, integrates broad personality traits within the context
of a cybernetic systems model (i.e., the study of goal-directed,
self-regulating systems; Wiener, 1961; Austin and Vancouver,
1996; Carver and Scheier, 1998; DeYoung, 2015). In this model,
broad trait dimensions represent particular functions that help
one move through a cybernetic chain, from (a) goal activation
to (b) action selection, (c) action, (d) outcome interpretation,
and finally, (e) comparison of the outcome to initial goal state.
Moreover, broad traits may impact this process at multiple stages.
For instance, a conscientious person may be more likely to
activate an achievement-oriented goal of passing an exam instead
of an affiliation-goal of spending time with friends (i.e., goal
activation), choose to stay at home to study instead of going out
to a party (i.e., action selection), and decide to study instead of
surfing the internet (i.e., action).
Although DeYoung’s model highlighted the functions of Big
5 traits, its insights also are applicable to other phenotypic
structural models of personality, such as the HEXACO (Ashton
and Lee, 2007), due to the large overlap between these
models. Similar to the “Big Five” model of personality, the
HEXACO also includes the trait dimensions of Extraversion,
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Openness, and Emotionality
(akin to Neuroticism); for these traits, the content coverage
within each dimension is similar enough at the broadest level to
be roughly equivalent when comparing research across models.
However, the most important advantage for using the HEXACO
structure is that it also recovers a 6th factor, Honesty/Humility,
which represents a tendency to adhere to social norms and
traditions, approach interpersonal interactions with sincerity and
fairness, and not expect special treatment from others (Ashton
and Lee, 2007). Notably, some studies have demonstrated
superior predictive validity for the HEXACO Honesty/Humility
dimension over the Big 5 across numerous domains (Ashton and
Lee, 2008). We focused our hypotheses on three dimensions that
may be the most strongly associated with rational responding:
Conscientiousness, Openness, and Honesty/Humility.
Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness reflects variation in the mechanisms that drive
tendencies to be organized, set goals, and work toward them
in an ordered way. Conscientious individuals are more likely to
pursue academic and achievement-oriented goals (Roberts and
Robins, 2000), and also demonstrate stronger performance in
academic and job settings (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998; Barrick
et al., 2001; de Vries et al., 2011). Lower Conscientiousness has
been associated with a wide variety of risk-taking behaviors,
which may adversely affect long-term health and psychosocial
outcomes (Gullone and Moore, 2000; Terracciano and Costa,
2004; Weller and Tikir, 2011). When goals have been set,
greater Conscientiousness may facilitate staying on task and
not being distracted by non-primary incentives or information
irrelevant to the task. Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
associations between Conscientiousness and neural regions
associated with attention, goal-directed planning, and cognitive
control (DeYoung et al., 2010; Adelstein et al., 2011). Directly
related to individual differences in DMC, Weller et al. (2012)
found that preadolescent children with higher levels of Effortful
Control scores, a temperament trait related to conscientiousness
in adulthood (Rothbart and Ahadi, 1994), performed better on a
subset of DMC scales.
Openness
Individuals reporting higher Openness to Experience tend to be
inquisitive, use their imagination, and take interest in others’
points of view (Ashton and Lee, 2007). According to DeYoung
(2014, 2015), Openness corresponds to individual differences in
cognitive exploration and engagement with information. These
functions may help to detect discrepancies between the current
state and the desired state identify goal-relevant stimuli in the
environment, and predict what strategies might be most effective
for goal pursuit (DeYoung, 2015; p. 44). Moreover, individuals
who report higher Openness to Experience may experience
more intrinsic rewards for engaging in cognitive activity, which
may also represent a motivational factor for remaining engaged
when faced with complex decisions (Denissen and Penke, 2008).
Additionally, functions ascribed to Openness, such as taking into
consideration other’s points of view and actively seeking out
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new information, are vital skills needed to make advantageous
decisions, especially in social situations (Hastie and Dawes, 2010).
Conversely, lower Openness may lead an individual to make
biased judgments based on a limited subset of information, or
on current emotions (Stanovich and West, 2008; Haran et al.,
2013). Finally, Baron (1993) suggests that “actively open-minded
thinkers,” a construct that shares variance with both Openness
and Conscientiousness, are more likely to seek out, attend to,
and evaluate a more complete set of information when making
choices. West et al. (2008) found that greater actively open-
minded thinking was associated with greater resistance to a
variety of heuristics and biases (Stanovich and West, 2007).
Honesty/Humility
Within a functional framework, greater Honesty/Humility may
represent self-regulatory tendencies that help one avoid acting
solely upon egoistic, self-interested impulses, as well as the
willingness to exploit others for personal gain. This dimension
may most likely be associated with normative decision making,
not only when the task involves understanding others (i.e.,
accurately detecting social norms), but also when short-term
gains may be at stake. Lower Honesty/Humility has been
associated with greater self-reported ethical and health-related
risk-taking (de Vries et al., 2009; Ashton et al., 2010; Weller
and Tikir, 2011), higher rates of counterproductive workplace
behaviors (Lee et al., 2005) and lower academic outcomes
(Taylor et al., 2015). Similarly, lower Honesty/Humility has
been associated with impulsivity and the “dark triad” traits
(Psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and Narcissism), traits that
are associated with antisocial tendencies and lower cognitive
control (Lee and Ashton, 2005; de Vries et al., 2009; Witt
et al., 2009). With respect to decision-making tendencies, Taylor
et al. (2015) found that higher Honesty/Humility was associated
with fewer errors on a conditional reasoning task, suggesting
that these individuals responded more rationally on this task.
Geisler and Allwood (2018) also reported similar, albeit indirect,
evidence for the association between Honesty/Humility and
DMC. Specifically, they found that individuals reporting higher
Machiavellianism demonstrated lower DMC performance.
Gender Differences
In order to gain a clearer conceptualization of the associations
between traits and DMC, we first considered potential gender
differences. Reported gender differences in decision-making may
represent biological differences in neuropsychological processes
(van de Bos et al., 2013), socialization processes (Eagly, 1995), or a
combination of both. Regardless of the underlying etiology, such
differences may result in behavioral and motivational differences
that potentially would be impactful for the goals that are set and
the manner by which they are enacted.
With respect to personality, evidence suggests small
gender differences overall for Extraversion, Conscientiousness,
Openness, and Agreeableness, but medium to large differences
for Neuroticism and Honesty/Humility (i.e., women report
higher scores than men; Lee and Ashton, 2004; Schmitt et al.,
2008; Wakabayashi, 2014; Romero et al., 2015). In contrast,
research has yielded mixed results regarding gender differences
for skills believed to be related to DMC. For instance, women
tend to demonstrate lower sensitivity to expected value,
indicative of less rational responding1 in uncertainty-based
laboratory decision-making tasks (Weller et al., 2010). Similarly,
men tend to score higher than women on numeracy and
cognitive reflection, tendencies believed to support mechanisms
of advantageous decision-making (Frederick, 2005; Weller et al.,
2013; Stanovich et al., 2017). Moreover, Toplak et al. (2017) found
men performed better than women on a composite “heuristic
and bias” index, which included items related to cognitive
reflection, in addition to statistical knowledge and syllogistic
reasoning. However, gender differences do not appear to be
consistent across different competencies, leaving this an open
question. For instance, Stanovich et al. (2017) reported no gender
differences for framing, risk knowledge, and overconfidence
measures.
Surprisingly, to our knowledge, gender differences for DMC
performance infrequently have been reported. In fact, only
two studies have reported gender differences, with varying
results. In a study that aimed to validate the Adult-DMC scale
in a Slovak sample of high school and university students,
Bavolar (2013) reported that men outperformed women on
the Applying Decision Rules and Sunk Costs scales only. In
contrast, in another validation study with a Chinese sample
of undergraduate students, Liang and Zou (2018) reported no
significant differences for Applying Decision Rules, but did find
similar gender differences for sunk cost effects. Notably, neither
study found significant gender differences for Resistance to
Framing Effects or Under/Overconfidence (c.f., Stanovich et al.,
2017).
These mixed results across different language versions of the
task raise the issue of potential measurement non-invariance
across groups (i.e., two individuals with the same ability level
on an underlying latent trait should have the same test or
item score). Specifically, if non-invariance is present, mean
group differences on a latent trait, or lack thereof, may result
from underlying differential functioning of the indicators across
groups (i.e., test bias) rather than actual differences in latent trait
scores. In turn, subsequent research that would report validity
coefficients based on a common regression line may inaccurately
estimate the magnitude of the effect for one, or both groups,
and therefore, raises questions related to interpretability of a test
score.
Though the current study was not designed to evaluate
cross-cultural differences in DMC, it can evaluate measurement
invariance across gender within a culture. Naturally, inquiries
regarding gender differences for DMC performance should first
be subject to measurement invariance testing across groups
within a specific culture. Invariance testing allows researchers
to identify potential sources of bias, and control/correct for
them (Vandenberg and Lance, 2000). However, the degree to
1Expected-value sensitivity indicates that an individual chooses an option with
a more favorable expected value (expressed as 6 EV = probability ∗outcome
magnitude of each possible option), given at least two option. Making EV-sensitive
choices can be considered an index of advantageous decision-making because,
mathematically, choosing an option with a superior EV consistently should lead
to more favorable outcomes over the long-run.
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which DMC demonstrates measurement invariance remains an
empirical question. Invariance testing for gender differences
on intelligence tests has typically demonstrated at least
partial measurement invariance for both adults and children
(Dolan et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2015). Yet, individual
differences in rational responding, and more specifically
DMC performance, are considered to be separable from
general mental ability (Stanovich et al., 2017); thus, it is
imprudent to extend invariance results from one construct to
another.
Hypotheses
In this study, we made three specific predictions. First, we
predicted that higher levels of Conscientiousness will be related
to higher DMC scores, and that this trait would be most
strongly associated with DMC. Second, we predicted that
higher self-reported Openness would be positively correlated
with DMC scores. Third, we expected that higher self-reported
Honesty/Humility would be associated with higher DMC scores.
With respect to gender, prior research does not clearly suggest
a consistent pattern of differences across the skills assessed by
the DMC components, making it imprudent to propose an
overall directional hypothesis, though the content of our tasks
compared to the tasks described in Stanovich et al. (2017) would
suggest that men would outperform women on an overall DMC
performance score if probabilistic knowledge is heavily recruited
on these scales. Similarly, to our knowledge, invariance testing
has never been conducted on an index of rational responding
before, leaving us without prior results by which we could base
a hypothesis. Thus, we considered these research questions to be
more exploratory in nature.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A third-party research firm sent 7044 participant invitation
emails to an opt-in panel of Italian community residents. 921
subjects completed the entire survey. We excluded 50 participants
who took less than 10 min to complete the entire survey
(Median = 31.78 min), and an additional 67 subjects because
they demonstrated evidence of careless responding (e.g., stylistic
or identical response patterns or overtly careless responses
across equivalently worded, but reversed items throughout the
assessment), resulting in N = 804.
The mean age for the final sample was 34.96 years (SD = 8.24;
58% women). Males were slightly older (M = 35.87 years,
SD = 8.10) than females (M = 34.37, SD = 8.30), t(802) = 2.47,
p = 0.014. Of those who completed the study, 7.2% of participants
did not possess a high school diploma, 52.2% had a high school
diploma or equivalent, 21.4% received a bachelor’s degree, and
19.1% received an advanced college degree. A chi-square analysis
testing for gender differences in education level (High School
education or less = 0; More than high school education = 1) was
not significant (χ2 = 0.27, p = 0.61). This study was approved by
the supporting university’s Ethical Review Committee.
Measures
Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC)
Participants completed four scales (Resistance to Framing,
Consistency in Risk Perception, Applying Decision Rules, and
Recognizing Social Norms) from the Italian-language A-DMC
assessment (Del Missier et al., 2012). The scale intercorrelations
are reported in Supplementary Information S1.
Resistance to Framing
Resistance to Framing was operationalized as the consistency
of responding across fourteen equivalent, but opposite-framed,
item pairs. Respondents either (a) made a choice between a
risky versus riskless option (i.e., risky choice-framing items),
or (b) rated the favorability of an event/product based on a
framed-attribute (i.e., attribute framing). Choices were made
on a six-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 = definitely prefer option
A; 6 = definitely prefer option B). Framing resistance was
determined by first calculating difference scores for the equivalent
pairs. Then, a mean absolute composite score was calculated.
Scores were then reflected such that greater positive values related
to more Resistance to Framing, α = 0.67. Other components of
this larger study were administered between different versions of
the framing problems to maximally space the differently framed
presentations.
Applying Decision Rules
This 10-item measure assessed participants’ ability to follow a
set of rules in order to make an accurate selection from five
options in a multi-attribute matrix. Participants were asked to
select a DVD system that matched a hypothetical buyer’s search
criteria (e.g., “Paolo wants to buy the DVD with the most attribute
ratings that were above average.”). For each scenario, participants
chose from a different set of five equally priced DVD players with
varying ratings of picture quality, sound quality, programming
options, and brand reliability (1 = very low; 5 = very high).
Performance was measured by the number of total correct scores,
α = 0.65.
Consistency in Risk Perception
Across 10 item pairs, we assessed the tendency for participants
to follow a basic rule of probability judgment (i.e., an event has
a greater probability of occurring over a longer time frame than
a shorter one). Specifically, respondents were first asked to rate
the possibility of an event occurring to them within the next
month (e.g., What is the probability that your driving will be
accident-free?). Later in the assessment, participants evaluated
the probability that the same events would occur to them over
the next 2 years2. Performance was indicated by the number of
probability-consistent responses made, α = 0.57.
2The scoring procedure used in this study is a simpler version of scoring for
Consistency in Risk Perception scale than the original method, which also includes
consistency across subsets/supersets and complementary events. We chose this to
maintain consistency with prior research using the same dataset (Weller et al.,
2015b). For the sake of due diligence, we compared the Consistency of Risk
Perception scale, as we calculated it, with the Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) method.
Our analyses robustly indicated that the results with the “expanded” scored scale
strongly resembled those currently in the paper. Specifically, we found (a) no
significant gender differences, (b) r = 0.88 between the two measures; (c) r = 0.97
the composite factor scores for one-factor solutions, and (d) correlation values
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Recognizing Social Norms
For this scale, participants first evaluated the opportunity to
endorse whether or not it is “sometimes OK” to engage in several
behaviors that may be deemed undesirable (e.g., to steal under
certain circumstances). Later in the assessment, respondents were
asked to rate “out of 100 people your age,” how many would
endorse each of the same behaviors (i.e., peer endorsement).
Performance was measured by each individual’s correlation
between the actual endorsement rate of the behavior in the
sample (out of 100%) and their estimated percentage of perceived
peer endorsements across the 16 behaviors, α = 0.76 for individual
endorsement rates.
Personality Dimensions
HEXACO-PI-R
Participants completed the Italian-language version of the 60-
item HEXACO-PI-R3 (Ashton et al., 2006; Ashton and Lee,
2009). Each item was rated on a five-point Likert scale
(5 = strongly agree; 1 = strongly disagree). The scale measures six
broad personality dimensions: Honesty/Humility, Emotionality,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness
(range α = 0.87–0.90). Intercorrelations between the HEXACO
dimensions ranged between r =−0.15 (between Extraversion and
Emotionality) to r = 0.38 (between Extraversion and Openness).
Intercorrelations of the HEXACO dimensions are presented in
Supplementary Information S2.
RESULTS
Mean Level Gender Differences for
HEXACO and DMC
As shown in Table 1, we observed the strongest gender
differences for HEXACO dimensions of Emotionality and
Honesty/Humility, in which women reported higher levels of
each (d = 0.62; d = 0.34). In contrast, higher Agreeableness
was reported for men (d = 0.23). The other dimensions showed
small effects (|d| < 0.20), which were all significant at p < 0.05
with the exception of Extraversion. Concerning DMC component
measures, males performed better than females on the Applying
Decision Rules and Resistance to Framing scales, t(802) = 2.38,
p = 0.018 and 2.26, p = 0.027, respectively.
Correlations Between HEXACO
Dimensions and DMC Components
Table 2 reports the correlations between DMC component
performance and the HEXACO dimensions. We did not find
a robust pattern of correlations between age and DMC scores;
considering that this study was not designed to study age
differences, we do not discuss age further. Honesty/Humility,
between the expanded composite and the one currently in the scale were highly
similar, only changing by at most 0.01. We note that this simplified manner by
which this scale has been calculated has been utilized before using other versions
of the DMC battery, with similar results (Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Weller et al.,
2012).
3http://hexaco.org
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of HEXACO personality dimensions and DMC
components.
Women Men Gender
differences
Cohen’s |d|M SD M SD
HEXACO Scale
Honesty-Humility 3.50 0.60 3.30 0.59 0.34
Emotionality 3.33 0.56 3.00 0.49 0.63
Extraversion 3.30 0.60 3.23 0.55 0.12
Agreeableness 2.97 0.54 3.09 0.52 0.23
Conscientiousness 3.67 0.57 3.57 0.58 0.18
Openness to experience 3.50 0.62 3.40 0.60 0.17
DMC component (z-scored)
Recognizing social norms 0.05 0.97 −0.08 1.04 0.13
Resistance to framing −0.06 0.99 0.10 1.01 0.16
Applying decision rules −0.07 0.94 0.10 1.04 0.17
Consistency in risk perception 0.04 0.97 −0.06 1.04 0.10
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience were positively
associated with performance on DMC components. We note
two exceptions to this pattern. First, unlike the other DMC
components in the overall sample, Resistance to Framing
was largely uncorrelated with the HEXACO dimensions,
with the exception that greater Resistance to Framing was
associated with lower Extraversion. Second, we observed notable
divergent patterns when examining gender-specific correlations.
For women, Recognizing Social Norms and Consistency in
Risk Perception were positively associated with Emotionality,
but this pattern was not present for men. In contrast,
higher Honesty/Humility was positively associated with greater
Resistance to Framing for men, but not for women.
Measurement Invariance Testing Across
Gender
Prior to examining the degree to which the HEXACO dimensions
uniquely accounted for variance in overall DMC scores, we
first sought to determine the degree of measurement invariance
by means of a multiple group analysis (men/women) of a
one-factor CFA with the four DMC variables as indicators
of the latent variable. These analyses were conducted using
the MPlus 7.4 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998–2018) software
package. Determining measurement invariance (i.e., the degree
to which the factor loadings and intercepts of the latent
variable are equivalent across groups) is a vital first step before
comparing groups; if non-invariant, direct group comparisons
may be inaccurate. Ideally, a construct should demonstrate scalar
invariance (i.e., the factor loadings and intercepts should largely
be equivalent; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000). However, strict
measurement invariance rarely holds in practice. Best practices
suggest that a latent construct should achieve at least partial
invariance (i.e., an intercept of an indicator may be allowed to be
freely estimated for each group, provided that a substantial drop
in model fit is not observed; Byrne et al., 1989).
These results are shown in Table 3. Our first test, a comparison
between configural (i.e., test of whether the structural CFA
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TABLE 2 | Correlations between HEXACO personality dimensions and DMC components.
Recognizing social norms Resistance to framing Applying decision rules Consistency in risk perception
Total Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men
Age 0.03 0.08 −0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.04 −0.08∗∗ −0.05 −0.14∗ −0.04 −0.02 −0.07
Honesty-Humility 0.22∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.02 −0.05 0.16∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.13∗
Emotionality 0.09 0.14∗∗ −0.01 −0.08 −0.04 −0.11∗ 0.01 0.12∗∗ −0.10 0.07 0.13∗∗ −0.05
Extraversion 0.03 0.06 −0.04 −0.12∗∗ −0.11∗ −0.11∗ −0.02 0.04 −0.13∗ 0.02 0.03 −0.01
Agreeableness 0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗ −0.14∗ 0.00 −0.03 0.05
Conscientiousness 0.23∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.26∗∗ −0.01 −0.04 0.07 0.28∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗
Openness to experience 0.16∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.15∗ −0.02 −0.05 0.05 0.16∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.11∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 3 | Fit statistics for multigroup analysis.
Model X2 Df X2/df BIC CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA RMSEA CI 90%
Configural invariance 1.62 2 0.81 8915.38 1.00 1.00 0.010 0.000 [0.000; 0.066]
Metric invariance 13.71 8 1.71 8942.68 0.972 0.958 0.048 0.042 [0.000; 0.079]
Scalar invariance 34.84 11 3.16 8943.76 0.884 0.873 0.060 0.073 [0.047; 0.102]
Partial invariance 21.12 10 2.11 8938.73 0.946 0.935 0.054 0.053 [0.020; 0.084]
BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion; CFI, Confirmatory Fit Index (≥0.90); TLI, Tucker–Lewis Index (≥0.90); SRMR, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (≤0.08);
RMSEA, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (≤0.08).
model is equivalent for men and women) and metric (i.e.,
factor loadings were the same across groups, but intercepts
allowed to vary) invariance, yielded a non-significant chi-square
difference test, 1χ2(6) = 12.09, p > 0.01. Further, the metric
invariance model reasonably fit the data, suggesting that DMC
across gender was metric invariant. However, when comparing
the model fit based on a chi-square difference test between
the metric and scalar (i.e., both factor loadings and intercepts
are constrained to be equal across groups) invariance models,
this value was significant 1χ2(3) = 21.15, p < 0.01. Upon
inspection of the modification indices, we conducted a third
model which relaxed the constraints on the Applying Decision
Rules indicator, allowing the intercepts to vary across groups.
This model yielded acceptable fit indices; the χ2 difference
test between the partial and metric invariance model was not
significant at p < 0.01, 1χ2(2) = 7.39. Our results suggest that
partial measurement invariance across gender was established for
the DMC construct.
Testing the Unique Predictive Power of
HEXACO Traits on DMC
Continuing with a multiple group analysis, we proceeded to add
the HEXACO dimensions into the model as covariates in order
to test the degree to which these traits accounted for individual
differences in DMC. Although testing gender-specific paths
between HEXACO and DMC should be considered exploratory,
this analysis can shine light on potential interaction effects,
while also controlling for gender differences in the intercept for
Applying Decision Rules. Parameters were freely estimated using
the maximum likelihood method. Our starting model included
paths regressing the DMC latent variable on the six HEXACO
dimensions and gender. In order to improve model fit, we
removed Agreeableness from the model due to non-significant
path coefficients to the DMC latent variable and re-ran the
model. We examined modification indices to determine whether
any direct effects from the personality dimensions to the DMC
indicators would improve model fit (Muthén, 1989). Based on
the modification indices, we added a direct path to Resistance
to Framing scores from Extraversion and re-ran the model. Our
final model reasonably fit the data (see Figure 1). Combined, the
covariates accounted for 36.6 and 26.7% of the variance in DMC
performance for men and women, respectively.
Consistent across gender, we found that three HEXACO
dimensions accounted for heterogeneity in DMC scores.
Conscientiousness was the strongest and most positive predictor
of overall DMC performance. Additionally, Honesty/Humility
and Openness were also both significantly, and positively, related
to DMC scores. These findings align with our hypotheses.
However, we found a divergent pattern for men and women
for Extraversion and Emotionality, respectively. As shown in
Figure 1A, introverted men scored higher on DMC than
extroverted men. However, this association was not observed
in women (see Figure 1B). A Wald test of parameter
constraints confirmed that these effects were significantly
different, χ2 = 11.67, p < 0.001. Additionally, for women,
we found that greater emotionality was associated with greater
DMC performance (Figure 1B). In contrast, there was a
negative, albeit non-significant, path observed for men, Wald
χ2 = 10.16, p = 0.001. The path coefficients for the other
HEXACO dimensions did not yield a significant difference across
gender.
The results from the multiple group analyses for Extraversion
were stronger in magnitude than those observed with respect
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FIGURE 1 | Multiple group analysis- standardized path estimates for men (A) and women (B). CFI, Confirmatory Fit Index; TLI, Tucker–Lewis Index; RMSEA, Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual). CFI = 0.924; TLI = 0.901; RMSEA = 0.042 (90% CI = 0.024–0.058);
SRMR = 0.039.
to the zero-order correlations with the DMC components,
suggesting a potential suppressor effect. Considering that
Conscientiousness and Openness both were positively correlated
with Extraversion, and also positively associated with DMC,
we suspected that the suppression effect occurred as a result
of including either one, or both, of these variables. To
confirm this, as a follow-up, we conducted a series of multiple
regression analyses, first regressing DMC scores (calculated as
a regression factor score of a one-factor exploratory factor
analysis solution) on the six HEXACO dimensions. Then,
we progressively removed the HEXACO dimension with the
smallest non-significant standardized coefficient and re-ran the
models to determine which variables need to be included for
the suppression effect to remain. Only after removing both
Conscientiousness and Openness (and leaving Extraversion as
the sole predictor), we found that the standardized coefficient for
Extraversion did not significantly predict DMC scores (β =−0.10,
p = 0.09), compared to the coefficient when the other two
variables remained in the model (β =−0.25, p< 0.001), or either
one was removed (β =−0.19, p< 0.01, and−0.20, p< 0.001, for
Conscientiousness and Openness, respectively). These findings
suggest that the non-overlapping variance in Extraversion not
attributable to Openness or Conscientiousness was associated
with lower DMC scores, whereas the overlapping shared variance
is associated with traits that promote better performance.
DISCUSSION
Accumulating research has demonstrated that individual
differences in rational responding are associated with outcomes
that are believed to be indicative of poor decision quality (Parker
and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Stanovich
et al., 2017; Toplak et al., 2017). However, less research has
investigated the degree to which broad personality traits may be
associated with these objective measures, despite documented
associations between personality and similar life outcomes. In
this study, we found that, irrespective of gender, three primary
personality dimensions were associated with rational decision-
making tendencies: Conscientiousness, Honesty/Humility, and
Openness. Our analyses also revealed several gender-specific
patterns of association; namely, an inverse relationship between
Extraversion and DMC for men, and a positive association
between Emotionality and DMC for women. These results
were present even after controlling for small, but significant
gender differences in performance on DMC component scales.
Taken together, such findings extend our knowledge about both
the construct validity of the DMC, as well as the functions of
broad-based personality traits.
Personality and DMC
As predicted, we found that Conscientiousness was the strongest
positive predictor of DMC performance. Prior research has
shown that Conscientiousness is a protective factor for desisting
from health-risking behaviors, as well as being a predictor of
academic and job performance, domains in which decision
quality is likely to impact (Robbins et al., 2004; Terracciano
and Costa, 2004). One implication of the current findings is
that conscientious individuals may perform better in workplace
settings (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998) because they are more self-
regulated with respect to goal-oriented behavior. They are more
likely to carefully evaluate options, maintain focus on set goals,
filter irrelevant information, and effectively integrate multiple
sources of information. Likewise, these skills may lead to an
increased likelihood to respond rationally to decisions, which,
in turn, are more likely to translate into advantageous long-term
behavioral outcomes (e.g., Roberts et al., 2007).
Our results also support past research implicating Openness
in rational decision-making. A core functional characteristic
of Openness is the tendency to seek out and consider new
knowledge when making choices. These tendencies are likely
to contribute to competent decision-making by identifying
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a larger set of relevant information by which subsequent
choices can be made. Beyond taking a broader perspective
toward decisions, individuals scoring higher in Openness
may feel intrinsically rewarded for engaging in complex
thought, suggesting a motivational factor for responding in an
accurate or consistent manner (Denissen and Penke, 2008).
More broadly, our findings are consistent with research that
has examined individual differences in Actively-Open-minded
Thinking (AOT), a construct that shares overlapping variance
with both Conscientiousness and Openness. This broad construct
has been associated with higher performance on a variety of
measures related to rational responding (Stanovich and West,
1997, 2007; Toplak et al., 2017). For example, Kokis et al.
(2002) found that AOT scores predicted inductive and deductive
reasoning performance of children as young as 10 years old.
Our findings suggest that AOT could be decomposed in order
to better understand the differential functions of its underlying
components with respect to decision-making tendencies.
Additionally, these results add to the burgeoning evidence
for the utility of assessing the Honesty/Humility dimension in
addition to the traditional “Big 5” traits. By definition, a core
component of low Honesty/Humility is the tendency for avoiding
acting upon egoistic, self-interested impulses to the detriment
of others – and often for short term gain. Consistent with
this reasoning, we believe that Honesty/Humility is associated
with low self-regulatory tendencies which may undermine
advantageous decision-making (Lauriola and Weller, 2018). This
myopic pattern of behavior has been observed in those reporting
lower Honesty/Humility, and may involve the discounting of
information (e.g., potential negative consequences, the feelings
of others, etc.) in favor of perceived personal gain, evidenced by
counterproductive work and academic behaviors. It can also be
observed in an elevated tendency to report health and ethical
risk taking. Weller and Tikir (2011) found that the relationship
between Honesty/Humility and risk taking in these domains
were mediated by reductions in risk perceptions and increases in
perceived expected benefits associated with those activities. We
believe that this finding suggests a less normative evaluation of
potential dangers and rewards, which could also be viewed as an
indicator of lower DMC.
We acknowledge that, on the surface, our results might appear
to run counter to research highlighting that individuals who score
high in Honesty/Humility show greater cooperation on certain
behavioral economics tasks, such as the Ultimatum Game (Hilbig
and Zettler, 2009; Zhao and Smillie, 2015). Hilbig and Zettler
(2009) interpreted this finding as being indicative of less rational
behavior. Although this prior finding was interpreted as evidence
of irrationality, it must be noted that claims of rationality on
this task may only be invoked if the actor is actually aiming to
maximize the subjective utility function of the payoff amount
of the game. From an evolutionary game theory perspective,
Nowak et al. (2000) argue that individuals who reject more unfair
offers may be maximizing reputation, especially if they expect
future interactions. It is tenable to reason that those reporting
greater Honesty/Humility are individuals who may strongly value
fairness and sincerity; hence, they may be more likely to maximize
reputation rather than payouts, making their response rational
within utility maximization context. Nonetheless, we find this
divergence interesting and hope that future research may further
disentangle these findings.
Gender Differences in DMC
Our results also help to clarify the nature of gender differences
for DMC, in which prior research has been mixed. Whereas
some studies have shown that men perform better on metrics
of rational responding such as expected value sensitivity
and probabilistic reasoning, other research using different
decision-making paradigms have shown no differences
(Stanovich et al., 2017). The current results suggest that
observed gender differences may be more confined to a range
of particular subcomponents, rather than global differences.
The measurement invariance analyses illustrated this point.
Specifically, our results suggested that a one-factor solution
reasonably fits the data for both men and women, though the
results did not reveal full scalar invariance. Specifically, men
and women responded differently to the Applying Decision
Rules scale, suggesting that overall DMC scores for women
may be associated with poorer performance within a particular
subdomain, rather than global differences across all forms of
rational responding. However, partial invariance is viewed as
being adequate for comparing latent variable scores across
groups, and suggests that a common regression line, regressing
a criterion on DMC, can be used. However, this point should be
taken into consideration in future studies when comparing other
groups, as it may impact the interpretability of DMC and related
constructs as a predictive measure.
Notably, we observed two gender-specific associations
between HEXACO traits and DMC performance. First, we found
that higher Emotionality was associated with better decision-
making for women only. This finding was surprising, considering
past research that has demonstrated that anxiety and fear, other
components of Emotionality, may impair advantageous decision
making and heighten risk perceptions (Lerner and Keltner,
2001; Miu et al., 2008; de Visser et al., 2010; Weller and Tikir,
2011). However, it is also important to note that the HEXACO
Emotionality scale contains more positive aspects than those
typically included in Neuroticism/Negative Emotionality scales.
For instance, it includes items related to Sentimentality, or the
tendency to create emotional bonds with others. We tentatively
speculate that this facet may promote skills associated with
advantageous decision-making. For example, developing and
maintaining interpersonal emotional bonds requires listening
to others and considering alternative viewpoints, two skills that
are important for making long-term advantageous decisions.
However, this explanation does not fully address why greater
Emotionality was associated with better performance for the
other DMC scales. Considering that we did not have an a priori
hypothesis for this effect, nor could we find any supporting
theoretical explanations, future research designed to more
extensively test the associations between facet-level Emotionality
(which we could not do reliably with the HEXACO-60) and a
broader range of decision-making skills is needed in order to
attain greater clarity. At the very least, though, our findings
point to the promise of a more nuanced view of Emotionality,
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highlighting that more positive aspects of emotionality may be
associated with better overall decision-making skills.
Another unexpected finding was that higher Extraversion was
associated with lower DMC scores for men, but not women.
According to the cybernetic Big Five model, Extraversion may
represent approach motivations and is posited to be particularly
sensitive to potential rewards (DeYoung, 2015). The current
results are intriguing because, with the exception of some risky-
choice framing items, reward sensitivity would not be expected
to be a primary driver of choice behavior across these tasks
in the same manner as in a risk-taking task, for example.
Notably, though, Resistance to Framing was the only DMC
scale that demonstrated significant zero-order correlations with
Extraversion across gender.
Our follow-up analyses revealed that, for men, the effects of
Extraversion became stronger when simultaneously accounting
for Conscientiousness and Openness. This finding suggests that
the overlapping variance shared by these three dimensions
has a positive effect on DMC, whereas Extraversion’s unique
component(s) has a mitigating effect. One potential source
of this non-overlapping variance may be sensation-seeking
tendencies, which are related to increased risk taking over
a wide context of behaviors (de Vries et al., 2009; Lauriola
and Weller, 2018). Though risk-taking, from a behavioral
economic perspective, does not necessarily imply irrational
decision processes, consistently engaging in behaviors that have
the potential to bear significant adverse consequences to health,
financial, and social well-being can be considered maladaptive
and indicative of poor decision quality (see Dewberry et al., 2013).
Notably, gender-specific associations between risk behaviors and
sensation-seeking previously have been reported. For instance,
Zuckerman and Kuhlman (2000) reported higher correlations
between sensation-seeking and certain risk behaviors (i.e.,
gambling and drug use) for men in comparison to women.
Unfortunately, like the gender-specific pattern observed with
Emotionality, we cannot adequately test this hypothesis with the
60-item HEXACO; thus, we underscore that these assertions are
speculative, and future research must be conducted to better
understand these effects.
Avenues for Future Research
We acknowledge several directions for future research. First,
despite a large sample size, we obtained a low response rate for the
study sample. As a consequence, we must temper our conclusions
about the degree to which we can generalize these findings to
the broader population. One potential problem of low response
rate is that individuals higher in DMC self-selected to take part
in this study. Nevertheless, both all the HEXACO dimensions
and a composite DMC score created by the factor score method
approached a normal distribution, which would speak against
range restriction as a potential problem. Though we cannot rule
out mean-level differences in DMC scores between responders
and non-responders, we have no reason a priori to believe that
the observed correlations between personality and DMC would
differ in a representative sample.
Second, because of time constraints, we assessed
shorter versions of both the A-DMC measures, as well
as the HEXACO. As a result, our study is silent to the
associations between personality and DMC components such as
Over/Underconfidence and Resistance to Sunk Costs. Notably,
the overconfidence scale did not correlate with other DMC
scales in the only paper reporting these associations with the
full Italian-language version of the DMC battery, suggesting
potential cross-cultural variation (such as items related to
interactions in relationships; Del Missier et al., 2012). Thus,
we hesitated to use this version of the test without invariance
testing of its own, which speak beyond our data. As researchers
from other countries begin to adopt and use the DMC measure,
testing cross-cultural non-invariance is a vital goal so that
researchers can compare results across different samples with
confidence that these scales measure the same construct(s).
However, even in its full length, the A-DMC battery only
includes six tasks for assessing decision-making tendencies. For
instance, the A-DMC measure does not include assessments
of intertemporal choice, “classic” heuristics and biases (e.g.,
representativeness and availability heuristics; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1972; Ceschi et al., 2018), or the ability to make
expected-value sensitive choices (Parker and Weller, 2015;
Stanovich et al., 2017). Integrating other decision-making skills
into a DMC framework and further explicating its construct
validity should be a continual psychometric goal of future
research (for a laudable effort in this direction, see Stanovich
et al., 2017).
As a final caveat, some of the reported correlations were
small in absolute magnitude. We caution readers to not simply
categorize small effects as trivial (Cortina and Landis, 2009).
This caveat is especially important to acknowledge because
associations between broad trait dimensions and single instances
of behavior are likely to be lower than if one aggregated
assessments of DMC over time. Additionally, DMC performance
is multifarious in nature, and thus, it is unlikely that any
one broad trait dimension will account for a proportion of
the variance that would be considered a “strong” effect size
(Cohen, 1994). As we have previously noted, future studies
may benefit from a more thorough investigation of traits at
the facet-level. We acknowledge a tradeoff between bandwidth
and fidelity, in which broader traits may be able to predict
a larger range of outcomes, but more narrow traits (e.g.,
facets) may predict more specific behaviors in a superior
manner (Cronbach and Gleser, 1957). This tradeoff also may
be important in functional personality frameworks because
lower-level traits may represent more specific functions related
to the broader functions of higher-order traits (DeYoung,
2015).
CONCLUSION
Because of the descriptive nature of traits like the Big 5,
theoretical discussion about their functional utility often is less
highlighted. That is, individual differences research is often
clear about who engages in a behavior rather than why (i.e.,
mechanisms that may underlie behaviors). In summary, the
current study provides insights into how personality may be
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associated with decision-processes. More broadly, the current
results represent a step in linking broader self-regulatory
functions, represented by trait dimensions, with more fine-
grained decision-making mechanisms. We hope that this study
will help to guide future research that aims to understand
the underlying mechanisms in what ways traits may impact
behavior. By bridging descriptive personality research associated
with social-cognitive mechanisms, researchers may begin to more
fully appreciate the cognitive and behavioral tendencies of those
who possess different levels of broader trait dimensions.
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